JFK File Expert Skeptical of Blakey's Joannides Claims

Introduction

Editor's Note: Scroll down to the bottom of the page if you prefer to see bullet points on this article.

I have always heard that you call (or email) an expert when you have a problem.

So, I contacted JFK file guru Robert Reynolds regarding the May 20th testimony of former HSCA staffer Dan Hardway. Reynolds is a professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature at National Chi Nan University in Puli, Taiwan who researches the JFK assassination in his free time. Reynolds specializes in the JFK Assassination Records Collection—particularly the new file releases. Reynolds writes at his blog and elsewhere time permitting, but he frequently helps lost souls like myself by providing files and interpretations of the same.

Throughout this article, Reynolds' comments will appear in blue blockquote.

Much of the testimony at both the April 1st and May 20th Luna hearings centered around CIA officer George Joannides who served as both a DRE case officer in the sixties and a liaison to the HSCA in 1978. The testimonies of conspiracy author Jefferson Morley and one-time House Select Committee on Assassinations staffer Dan Hardway were generally well-received by the media even though they lacked significant new information. Both men leveled accusations regarding Joannides' alleged stonewalling of Congress by not providing pertinent information to investigators.

First, let's deal with the low-hanging fruit. As is often the case, much of what Morley said about Joannides may be dismissed because it is not accurate. Morley declared in his April 1st written statement to the Luna Committee that "Three top CIA officers lied under oath about JFK’s assassination." Setting aside Helms and Angleton, whom I discussed in a previous blog post, note that Joannides could not have lied "under oath" simply because he never testified or provided an affidavit to any government body about the JFK case.

As far as I can tell, Morley is also wrong when he claims that Dan Hardway made a "direct request" to Joannides for the name of the DRE case officer in 1963. Hardway never claimed in his Luna statement that he made such a request. Indeed, Hardway admitted that he "did little, if any, research that I recall into the [DRE]." So, obviously, he would have no reason to ask Joannides about a DRE case officer. Especially when you consider that his primary assignment was Oswald and Mexico City. And Reynolds and I both came up empty when searching earlier Hardway statements for any such declaration. Hardway has only said Joannides obstructed their investigation—not that he lied directly to him about the identity of the case officer. If Morley has evidence to back up his claim, he should provide it.

When looking at Hardway's claims, one realizes they are based as much on what Morley says about an "Oswald Operation" and the assertions of his old boss at the HSCA G. Robert Blakey, who served as the committee's Chief Counsel, as they are on his own memories. Indeed, even Morley's Luna statement mentioned Blakey's opinion that Joannides committed a "felony" by withholding evidence. Similarly, when reading the declarations of Hardway and his HSCA partner Edwin Lopez submitted for a lawsuit against the CIA in 2017, Blakey's assertions are again a key component.

This reliance on Blakey's comments sparked a few questions in my skeptical mind. What is the nature of the claims that Blakey has made regarding Joannides and the DRE? How long has he been making them? How accurate are Blakey's claims and is there documentation to back up his statements? Finally, have his statements been consistent through the years or do they show an evolution of thought? To unpack all of this, Reynolds helped me take a deep dive into the bowels of the HSCA files.

First, let's address the elephant in the room. No, Joannides did not volunteer any information about the DRE to Hardway or Blakey or anyone else. His purpose was to serve as a liaison to the HSCA and deal with reasonable requests for information (one clearly unreasonable request will be discussed later). CIA officers of the time took a secrecy oath and were serious about maintaining the agency's private affairs. And there is no indication that Joannides' secrecy oath was waived as was the case with a few CIA officers who testified under oath. So, as far as Joannides was concerned, he was there to do a job and certainly did not intend to divulge any agency information without prompting. And it is not reasonable, in my view, to expect him to do so.

Having said this, if Joannides provably denied a specific request from Blakey or Hardway for the identity of the DRE case officer, that could be significant. It could also mean that Joannides simply didn't want to expose his covert work to scrutiny for non-nefarious reasons.

Breckinridge is Hired as HSCA Principal Coordinator (PC)

Before looking at Blakey's claims, it would be useful to establish why, how, and when Joannides started working as the HSCA liaison. It is also instructive to look at the animus that existed between the CIA and the HSCA and the causes of that conflict as seen by both sides. Who better to tell the story from the agency perspective than Scott Breckinridge, the man who hired Joannides. Breckinridge published a book titled The CIA and the Cold War: A Memoir which, among other things, details his time with the HSCA. Portions of the book were kindly provided to me by Reynolds. Breckinridge wrote the following about how he got the job as PC to the HSCA:

In mid-1978 HSCA leveled a blast against the agency's performance in response to its requests. The strident quality of the complaint led to the decision that the agency had best establish a special staff to deal with the committee’s investigators, as had been done with the Rockefeller Commission and also with the previous congressional inquiries. Someone remembered that I had been involved in the earlier episodes, and I was tagged to do it.

Blakey was informed of the Breckinridge appointment as PC on May 19. Reynolds adds the following detail:

Blakey addressed HSCA's written requests to Patrick Carpentier [Breckinridge's predecessor as liaison coordinator] up until the end of May, 1978. He first addressed a request to Breckinridge on 5/26/78, and continued to do so from then on, until the HSCA officially closed in December 1978. As for Joannides, Breckinridge hired him in June 1978, soon after he became PC." (See Breckinridge's "Memo in lieu of fitness report").

The Breckinridge book continues:

To say I was not enthusiastic about the assignment is to put it mildly. I did have some conditions for taking the assignment, if it was to be done properly. I wanted two officers assigned to me, along with clerical and secretarial support, and adequate space of our own. That was forthcoming. This new staff was to be attached to the Office of the Legislative Counsel, which was quite appropriate; however, I felt I must have direct access to the Director’s office, which took the form of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director.

The two officers chosen by Breckinridge were Rodger Gabrielson, who was already working with the HSCA investigators, and, of course, Joannides. Reynolds picks up the story:

Breckinridge recalls hiring Joannides because he wanted someone from [the Directorate of Plans] as his assistant, someone who knew his way around the Directorate. He surely must have known that Joannides had worked in JMWAVE. I think he might well have thought of that as an advantage, not as some kind of treachery [to purposely hide documents or other evidence of a conspiracy to kill JFK]. Another somewhat similar case was that of Paul Garbler, who was of interest because he worked at Moscow station immediately after Oswald left I think. ARRB later interviewed him to find out specific details about the station and employees. He too served as liaison to the HSCA in the early days (1977).

Breckinridge's book discusses the problems that existed between the HSCA and the CIA from the perspective of the agency:

I was particularly interested in what had set off the fireworks of the HSCA complaint. It was important to understand that if we were to deal with those folk successfully. While there was a lot of static in the descriptions of what happened, the main details were fairly clear. The agency had received a very heavy number of requests. They had all been properly logged in as soon as possible after being received and passed on to those parts of the agency where the requested information was to be found, if it existed. However, the volume was such that a backlog had developed initially, but that part of the record-keeping had been brought up to date. However, when materials were brought to the reading room, not all of it was recorded when received there.

The following passage from Breckinridge's book describes what Reynolds calls "the first of a number of confrontations" he had with HSCA staff.

... it developed that the HSCA people had asked for a meeting. It appeared that they had some problems with their own records and wanted to compare theirs with ours. The log sheets were made available to them, with the explanation that they were not up to date. I spoke separately with each of the agency people at that meeting, who were unanimous about what transpired. They had no concern with the purely administrative records being seen by the HSCA people, especially if it might help with their records. The HSCA elected to interpret the agency records as up to date, so far as showing nondelivery of files to the reading room. They charged that the agency was at least dilatory in responding to requests, with ill-concealed overtones of bad faith as well

Breckinridge continues:

After I had been on the job a few weeks ... an HSCA representative came in to ask for access again to our records: the log sheets on their requests and delivery to the “reading room.” I said they would not be made available. They were our administrative records for the purpose of knowing where we stood, with no substantive significance so far as their mission was concerned. We had extended them the courtesy of looking at those records earlier, and they had abused the privilege, misrepresenting the status of things. HSCA had been told our logging of actions was not up to date, but they had chosen to state that they were, attacking on the false statement of facts. He was offended, saying that he had been told that the records were current. I told him I had interviewed the agency people who were present during that exchange, and that simply was not so.

For those who are interested in reading more about the conflicts between Breckinridge and Blakey, Reynolds found this document which is a memo by Breckinridge regarding Blakey's complaints about late requests.

A more explicit example of the "fireworks" mentioned by Breckinridge comes in the form of a confrontation between Joannides and Hardway. What follows is Morley's presentation of Hardway's version of events from Morley v. CIA (p. 32):

“You wrote in your Miami New Times piece that Joannides was a nice guy,” [Hardway] said. “That’s not the man I dealt with. He was a total asshole.” Joannides was an elusive phantom to me, a spook. Hardway had known the man, looked him in the eye. He said he’d had a shouting match with him. Hardway submitted an affidavit to the court in support of my records request. He did not mince words. “I am now certain that Joannides was hiding evidence of a conspiracy to kill Kennedy,” he wrote. “This conspiracy involved CIA officers in the DRE and organized-crime figures.”

Breckinridge's version of what was likely the same event makes Hardway's anger even more understandable:

On one or two occasions when some young investigator would come in and assert what he felt was his manhood, George simply and directly cooled him off; George had been where the action was and had limited time for immature theatrics. They tested him a couple of times and thereafter dealt with him properly.

Summing up the conflicts between HSCA and CIA, on one hand you have Breckinridge vs. Blakey. A career agency man vs. a law professor. One man tasked with obtaining information and the other with keeping secrets—even those that had nothing to do with JFK—while complying with legitimate requests. So, it is not too hard to see how problems could arise. On the other hand, the potential for conflict is even more apparent in the case of Joannides and Hardway. The latter was just twenty-four years old at the time of his HSCA service while Joannides was fifty-six. The impeccable Joannides was wearing tailored suits—Hardway reportedly not so much. According to Morley's unpublished manuscript, "The Perfect Man for the Job," Joannides was skeptical of JFK conspiracy theories while Hardway was obviously a firm supporter of them. So, a significant cultural and generational gap between the two men exacerbated the problems.

Blakey Circa 1998

Now, let's begin our examination of Blakey's statements over the years. Has there been an evolution or has he always said essentially the same thing?

According to Morley's eBook Morley v. CIA, he informed Blakey in late 1998 that Joannides had been the DRE case officer in 1963 shortly after receiving the information from the CIA via the ARRB. Blakey was reportedly "stunned" and "angry." Morley wrote (p. 18):

He explained to me what he would later say at greater length in an interview with PBS Frontline: Joannides had personally obstructed Congress’s 1978 reinvestigation of JFK’s murder.

But Joannides only obstructed the investigation if it can be proven that he lied to investigators. I don't believe withholding information that he may have deemed irrelevant meets that standard. Others may disagree, but in any case, we will try to determine later if Joannides lied directly to investigators or not.

So, in 1998, Blakey was angry and believed Joannides had obstructed Congress.

Blakey Circa 2001

In 2001, Morley published his well-known article "Revelation 19.63" in the Miami New Times. Blakey is quoted as saying:

If I had known then what Joannides was doing in 1963, I would have demanded that the agency take him off the job [of responding to committee inquiries] ... I would have sat him down and interviewed him. Under oath ... None of us knew that he had been a contact agent for the DRE in 1963. That was one of the groups we had targeted for investigation ... He was a witness, the assassination happened on his watch.

The 2001 Blakey is certainly more verbal on the matter. He would have put Joannides on the stand which was his right to do. Blakey also claims that the DRE was a group "targeted for investigation." But what sort of investigation was really done on the DRE?

Gaeton Fonzi, a journalist who firmly believed in conspiracy narratives, was the member of Blakey's staff who was credited as principal author of the report on the DRE. The document covered a less than impressive eight pages including footnotes. After a two-and-a-half page summary of the group's history, Fonzi spent much of the remainder of the report discussing the allegations of Clare Boothe Luce whose dubious claims were surprisingly deemed to be of "special interest" to the committee. Luce had told a journalist a tale about Lee Harvey Oswald offering to kill Castro and the Secretary of the Navy among other things. Miami DRE member Jose Lanusa's story of what the DRE did when they realized after the assassination that their delegate, Carlos Bringuier, had interacted with Oswald made it into Fonzi's report, but apparently only because Lanusa had met Luce. So, I guess you could say the DRE was targeted for investigation relating to conspiracy theories at least. In the end, neither Lanusa or Fonzi believed Luce.

Speaking of Fonzi, let's return to Morley's 2001 piece in which he wrote the following about his conversation with Fonzi:

When [Fonzi] had asked who'd handled contacts with the Directorate in 1963, the committee was informed -- via the CIA general counsel's office -- that the agency did not know. "We got the runaround from day one on the DRE," says Fonzi ... "The Joannides revelation just reconfirms that the CIA deceived the American people about who really was responsible for Kennedy's death."

Fonzi is clearly making a more serious allegation regarding a denial of the identity of the DRE case officer than Blakey has so far although he does not specifically mention Joannides as the source. Breckinridge told Morley that he "couldn't recall" if he was aware of Joannides' position in 1963 when he hired him to be HSCA liaison but knew that Joannides was "a man who had a good reputation." So, it would not be incriminating if Breckinridge told Fonzi that he didn't know who the 1963 case officer was as Fonzi seems to be claiming.

So our 2001 version of Blakey is still not saying much in the way of damning accusations against Joannides. Not even as much as his investigator Fonzi is.

Blakey Circa 2003

Blakey was so upset by the Morley revelations regarding Joannides that in 2003 he created an addendum to his statements made to PBS Frontline for their 1993 documentary "Who Was Lee Harvey Oswald." Blakey's relevant assertions are in bold followed by my reply.

Outrageously, the Agency did not tell the Warren Commission or our committee that it had financial and other connections with the DRE, a group that Oswald had direct dealings with!

Author Vincent Bugliosi wrote the following about this Blakey assertion in the endnotes (p. 682) of his 2007 Reclaiming History:

Even volume 10 from Blakey’s own HSCA way back in 1978 says that “the leaders of the DRE were kept on a regular monthly retainer by the U.S. Government, as were all members engaged in training for paramilitary operations and propaganda dissemination. They were also supplied with weapons and ammunition on occasion.”

The source of the HSCA volume 10 statement is listed as simply an interview conducted by the HSCA. But information that Bugliosi likely was unaware of further strengthens this point. The interview was of DRE case officer Ross Crozier by Fonzi (p. 11), who was certainly in a position to know that the agency funding the DRE was specifically the CIA. Indeed, in an earlier draft of the DRE report the identity of the funding entity was changed from "CIA" to "US Government."

I was not told of Joannides’ background with the DRE, a focal point of the investigation.

There is no proof that Breckinridge was aware of Joannides' tenure as the DRE case officer. In fact, in Morley's unpublished manuscript "The Perfect Man for the Job" discussed below, Morley wrote that Breckinridge "says that he did not know of Joannides' Miami assignment in 1963."

The committee’s researchers immediately complained to me that Joannides was, in fact, not facilitating but obstructing our obtaining of documents.

The problems between the CIA and the HSCA have been discussed above.

For these reasons, I no longer believe that we were able to conduct an appropriate investigation of the Agency and its relationship to Oswald.

That is Blakey's belief; fair enough. But note that this statement could also be interpreted as an convenient way to fend off criticism of the committee's work.

Anyone interested in pursuing this story further should consult the reporting by Jefferson Morley of the Washington Post. See, e.g., Jefferson Morley, “Revelation 19.63” Miami New Times (April 2001).

One thing is clear. Blakey's thinking on the matter has been heavily influenced by Morley's conspiracy-oriented work.

Blakey "Perfect Man"

Morley again quotes Blakey in his unpublished and undated manuscript titled "The Perfect Man For the Job." This article probably dates from about 2004-2005, and shows Blakey's developing views as he learns more about Morley's FOIA lawsuit against CIA. Blakey's comments are general in nature and in line with his PBS addendum. But Blakey does add a new acusation. "Joannides compromised our investigation and thwarted the will of Congress which was to have [a] full investigation. He committed a felony." Later in the piece, Blakey said, "Joannides was in a position where he could control our investigation. We only saw what he wanted us to see."

By 2005 then, Blakey's Joannides claims, while significant, were not as serious as what was to come.

Blakey Circa 2006

In the year 2006, by way of Blakey's declaration in Morley's FOIA lawsuit against the CIA, we are presented with the first bits of evidence for a Joannides denial of the DRE case officer's identity. But Blakey is merely the reporter of the information. The author is really Gaeton Fonzi. Blakey stated:

Significantly, my request [for the identity of the DRE case officer] was directed to George Joannides, who was the agency's liaison officer with our investigation at the time. As one of my investigators, Gaeton Fonzi, recently wrote, Joannides said "he could not find any records indicating the name of the DRE's control officer or documents revealing his operational activities. But, Joannides said, he would continue looking for the agency's DRE files as well as any records that would help him identify and locate the agency's control officer, the one man who would have the most information about the DRE and its contact with Lee Harvey Oswald."

Note that Blakey says his request was "directed to" Joannides, not that he made it directly to Joannides himself. Blakey is relying not on his own memory of the events but rather on Fonzi's remembrances of the situation which were published in Gold Coast Magazine in an article entitled "The JFK Assassination Redux" in 2005.

Robert Reynolds adds:

Blakey says "my request was directed to George Joannides." This seems to contradict the idea that Blakey spoke directly to Joannides. Elsewhere, Blakey says, "The HSCA tenure expired before Joannides or the Agency responded." This seems to contradict Fonzi's statement that Joannides reported he could not find records on the DRE "control officer" but would continue looking. Quite a kettle of contradictions.

Let's look at some of the other Blakey claims (in bold) from this court document:

The DRE was a target of our investigation because of contacts between its members in its New Orleans delegation and Oswald in August 1963. In fact, the Committee specifically focused on this incident in its final report, and its findings reflect the Committee's extensive investigation of the DRE and its activities. HSCA Final Report, p. 141

Agreed. Blakey and the committee were interested in LHO and his interaction with the DRE and the report discusses this. So far, so good.

In particular, on May 23, 1978, I personally requested that the CIA provide photographs of DRE members Juan Manual [sic] Salvat Roque and Tony Lanuza. I also requested a photograph of Ross Crosier, a CIA contract officer who had worked with the DRE in 1961-62 before Joannides took over handling of the group.

Here is the link to the May 23, 1978 request. This is one of three requests cited by Blakey at different times to back up his various claims. But I'm not sure what Blakey hopes to prove by this request for photos other than he wanted to know what these men looked like. Note that in his 2014 statement (discussed below), which was intended for consumption by the conspiracy-oriented AARC group, he didn't mention that the request was merely for photos. The agency replied to the request on July 3rd, providing the requested photos. But there was no request for documents on DRE case officers here. Note that the CIA provided the 201 file on Crozier who was the first DRE case officer. But Reynolds says " no one bothered to look at [it]."

In a related matter, Reynolds points out that the July 3rd release of photos debunks another Morley claim from his "Perfect Man" piece. Morley wrote, "The committee wanted photographs of DRE leaders Manuel Salvat, and Tony Lanusa. Once upon a time, Joannides knew these men personally. He said nothing and told the committee that the CIA had no photos."

On July 11, 1978, I specifically requested documents on the DRE. This request was recorded by the office of Legislative counsel, as was the agency's response: to provide "misc. documents." See Attachment 1.

When searching for the alleged July 11 request, Reynolds first came up empty. He was eventually able to find a request by Blakey from the date in question, but as he told me, "As far as I know, none of these people are DRE, and the name DRE does not appear on this request." Reynolds was also unable to locate the "Attachment 1" referred to by Blakey in Morley's court documents. But after more searching, Reynolds believes he has solved the mystery of the "missing" July 11 request. The clue which aided him in his discovery was Blakey's odd use of the term "misc. documents" since Reynolds was aware that the documents provided by the CIA were specific and extensive. He told me:

ARC 104-10067-10162 ("LOGS OF HSCA REQUESTS") is a chronological list of HSCA requests to CIA-for information. At the top of page 154 there is a row that gives the date 22.3.78 and the OLC number 78-1179/1. The request subject is "Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil." Action office is IMS, response date is 11.7.78, and the comments say "Misc documents".

Here is the link to 104-10067-10162. Reynolds continues:

"If this is really the document Blakey has in mind, he slipped up here, switching the date of the CIA response with the date of the HSCA request. As the log shows, the date of the HSCA request for the DRE docs was 3/22/78, and the CIA responded on 7/11/78. The "misc documents" mentioned here are in fact an extensive set of DRE docs, consisting of over a dozen files totaling almost 1500 pages. There is a 14 page CIA letter (ARC 104-10063-10130) enumerating all the files and docs they produced in response to the massive 3/22 HSCA request.

ARC 104-10063-10130 may be found HERE

HSCA investigators under my supervision interviewed three former leaders of DRE about the group's contacts with Oswald: Jose Antonio Lanuza, Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, and Carlos Bringuier. In particular, [the HSCA] sought to identify the DRE's CIA case officer in 1963.

But was the HSCA really that concerned about the identity of the case officer? Bringuier has always denied that he knew the identity of or had any contact with the case officer in 1963. When interviewed by Fonzi, Lanusa stated that he couldn't remember the case officer's "code name." So, Fonzi was at least asking about the identity of the case officer or Lanusa offered it without prompting.

But, when Fonzi interviewed Salvat, the latter provided several code names of "CIA officials" he had known after Crozier. One of these, "Howard," was indeed the code name for their DRE contact who Morley believes is Joannides (The Mary Ferrell Foundation website, based at least partly on analysis by Morley, says only "probable"). Salvat mentioned four individuals but didn't characterize any of them beyond being "CIA officials." And since there were only two DRE case officers after Crozier, not all of names could be case officers. So, the HSCA would have had no reason to believe that "Howard" was anyone special. And there is no indication that Fonzi followed up on "Howard" or any of the other names provided by Salvat. Additionally, Reynolds told me, " I can find no record of a written or oral request by Blakey, or Hardway, for info on the DRE case officer."

Furthermore, consider the fact that Fonzi knew from his interview with Crozier that there had been a 1963 DRE case officer whose name the latter couldn't remember. If Blakey was really so interested in identifying the case officer, he could have put Crozier on the stand after waiving his secrecy oath. Even if Crozier couldn't remember the name of the case officer, he could have directed Blakey to someone who would.

Blakey Circa 2014

In a 2014 address before the Assassination Archives and Research Center, Blakey added a new information request to his previously mentioned May and July requests in support of his accusations:

When working as Chief Counsel for the HSCA, I requested all the Agency files on the DRE and its members as early as March of 1978. That request included a demand that the Agency identify any employees who had, in the period from 1960 to 1964, worked with the DRE

Here is the March 22, 1978 request from Blakey to Breckinridge's predecessor Patrick Carpentier. Blakey asked for information on 75 separate organizations and individuals. Only a few of these are pertinent to our discussion:

• Carlos Bringuier (DRE delegate)
• Ross Crozier (first DRE case officer)
• Jose Lanusa (Miami DRE member)
• Juan Manuel Salvat (Miami DRE member)
• DRE (general request)

To make sure his bases were fully covered, Blakey inserted the following paragraph near the end of the document:

In addition please identify, for purposes of interview by Select Committee staff, any employees/agents/contacts you had during the period of 1960 through 1964 who were providing to you results and/or reports of surveillance, investigation, and/or interviews of the activities and leaders of the active Cuban anti-Castro groups in Miami and New Orleans.

At first blush, this paragraph could be broadly be interpreted as a request for the identity of the DRE case officer if one were inclined to be generous. But the problems with the query are soon apparent. Commenting on this final all-encompassing paragraph, Reynolds says:

As far as I can tell, the CIA did not respond to this part of the request. To do so, they would have had to provide the names and addresses of hundreds, perhaps thousands of people. Remember that JMWAVE was the largest CIA station in the world for many years, with hundreds of people working there at any one time.

And as we have established, Joannides was not yet working for the HSCA at the time of this March request so it is impossible for this to qualify as a request to Joannides for information on the DRE case officer. Morley apparently tries to get around this prickly problem in "The Perfect Man for the Job" by referring to Blakey's query as a "standing request" although he provides no explanation of why this is so.

Therefore, the March request by Blakey cannot reasonably be seen as a request to Joannides for the identity of the DRE case officer. Note that the CIA responded to the request on July 11.

The Agency repeatedly assured the Committee that they had no contact with the DRE in 1963, having severed all contacts in April of that year.

Reynolds responds:

"I can't find any document from CIA to HSCA claiming that they broke off contact with DRE in April of 1963. It makes no sense to claim that. The records that CIA provided to HSCA include two files on CIA-DRE operations in 1963, plainly labeled as such. Why would CIA tell a lie contradicting the cover sheets on their own files? Moreover, HSCA staff knew about these files; HSCA researcher Betsy Palmer, who helped write the HSCA chapter on DRE, signed out both of them. Yet the DRE chapter mentions nothing about any contradictory claims."

The leaders of the DRE, in interviews with the Committee's staff, indicated that they worked with a CIA case officer in 1963. The Agency assured me they would search their records to try to identify such an officer. The Agency employee who contacted me to advise that they could find no record of any such case officer was George Joannides. He did tell us, however, that he would keep looking ... he also lied directly to me.

Note the language used by Blakey. He first says Joannides contacted him to deny knowledge of the case officer. However, he then says "he did tell us ... that he would keep looking" (emphasis added). "Us" implies members of Blakey's staff. "Keep looking" sounds an awful lot like "continue looking" which comes from Fonzi's Gold Coast article. It would seem that Blakey is still pulling his information from Fonzi's article rather than a documented source or his own recollections.

Blakey Circa 2017

If Blakey's statements from 1998 show an evolution, one 2017 assertion in particular could be called a quantum leap.

This Blakey assertion and several others come from a declaration in support of a lawsuit filed against the CIA by Blakey, Hardway and the latter's HSCA partner Edwin Lopez seeking records. Before considering the quantum leap, there are several other Blakey assertions to discuss including a particularly thorny one:

In the Nelson Declaration [a reply from Delores Nelson of the CIA during Morley's multi-year lawsuit against the agency], made under penalties of perjury as a person “authorized to sign declarations on behalf of CIA” Ms. Nelson averred that CIA acknowledged Joannides had only worked on covert projects during his career with CIA on two occasions. Those two occasions admitted were when he was working “during the years 1962 through 1964 and 1978 through 1979 – time periods for which the CIA previously acknowledged Joannides’ participation in covert projects, operations, and assignments.” Id. Joannides assignment in 1978 through 1979 was as liaison with the HSCA. This simply means that Joannides’s work as liaison with the HSCA was a covert operation of the CIA. His office seems to have been to cover up evidence, not facilitate its production. CIA has already admitted as much.

Reynolds has studied this issue closely and gave this opinion:

Here is the source of Blakey's quote, paragraphs 15-16 of the Nelson declaration, to show the complete context:

15. In its 22 December 2004 letter [to Morley], the CIA also asserted a GLOMAR [neither confirm nor deny] response "with respect to that portion of [Plaintiff's] request seeking records regarding Mr. Joannides' participation in any covert project, operation, or assignment, unless of course previously acknowledged." (Id. at 2.) The CIA stated it could "neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to this part of Plaintiff's request." (Id. at 2.) The CIA'S GLOMAR response applies to Joannides' covert projects, operations, and assignments except those occurring during the years 1962 through 1964 and 1978 through 1979 -- time periods for which the CIA previously acknowledged Joannides' participation in covert projects, operations, and assignments.
16. The CIA based its GLOMAR response in 2004 upon the understanding that the CIA had previously acknowledged Joannides' participation in only two specific covert projects, operations, or assignments. The CIA made these acknowledgments in conjunction with its release of JFK-related records pursuant to the JFK Act. First, the CIA acknowledged Joannides participated in a covert action codenamed JM/WAVE or JMWAVE from 1962 through 1964. Second, the CIA acknowledged Joannides served as a CIA representative to the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations from 1978 through 1979. Joannides served undercover in both of these assignments. Joannides also served undercover in projects, operations, and assignments before and after the two acknowledged time periods. Based upon its understanding of Joannides' cover status and the fact that answering Plaintiff's FOIA request in the categorical manner in which it was framed would disclose classified information, the CIA determined it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of records relating to Joannides' covert projects, operations, or assignments outside the years 1962 through 1964 and 1978 through 1979.

Blakey treats the phrase "covert project, operation, or assignment" as if it meant there was only one type of work that undercover CIA employees do, but Paragraph 16 does NOT characterize Joannides as doing the same kind of work in 1962-1964 and 1978-1979. It says: "First, the CIA acknowledged Joannides participated in a covert action codenamed JM/WAVE or JMWAVE from 1962 through 1964. Second, the CIA acknowledged Joannides served as a CIA representative to the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations from 1978 through 1979. Joannides served undercover in both of these assignments."
Blakey's declaration ignores the distinction CIA drew, asserts what CIA did not assert, and thus claims CIA admitted that Joannides' job was to cover up evidence, not provide it. All this is quite wrong. CIA did NOT admit that when Joannides served as a CIA representative to HSCA it was part of a covert action. It draws a clear distinction between JMWAVE and HSCA liaison. JMWAVE was acknowledged as a covert action. Liaison was NOT acknowledged as a covert action.

In contrast to the complex issue of Joannides' cover, here are a few Blakey claims which are easily refuted.

In 1977 and 1978, I was repeatedly (and falsely) assured by CIA as an organization, and Joannides personally, that CIA had no operational interest in or connection to the Directorio Revoucionario Estudantil (“DRE”), an anti-Castro Cuban exile group operating in Miami, New Orleans, and Dallas in 1963 with whom Lee Harvey Oswald had public and prominent encounters.

Blakey was (or should have been) aware that the DRE was indeed "connected" to the agency. Reynolds explains:

... as Fred Litwin discovered, HSCA interviewed Lanusa in April 1978, and he directly referred to meeting the DRE case officer in November 1963 after the assassination. Apparently Blakey was not there for the interview."

Litwin's article may be found HERE (scroll down to "Dan Hardway").

Additionally, The HSCA was aware that CIA agent Crozier was a DRE case officer and Blakey requested information on him by his own admission.

So, it would make absolutely no sense for the CIA to tell Blakey they had no connection to the DRE.

I was also assured that there was no CIA case officer assigned to work with DRE in 1963.

Again, this is nonsense as Lanusa's statement shows. Now, the quantum leap:

At one point I gave Joannides information about the alias, Mr. Howard, that members of DRE said their CIA contact used in 1963 to aid his search for information in regard to CIA contacts with DRE. Joannides assured me that they could find no record of any such officer assigned to DRE, but that he would keep looking. See, e.g., Letter from G. Robert Blakey to Patrick Carpenter, CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, 03/22/1978, RIF 180-10140-10065, attached hereto as Exhibit 20.

Of all the exaggerations, misstatements and inaccurate claims by Blakey regarding Joannides and the DRE from 1998 to 2017, this one stands out.

First, there is no credible evidence that anyone in the DRE told the HSCA that their contact was code named "Howard." As mentioned, Salvat did tell Fonzi about the name "Howard" but he never said that he was the case officer who followed Crozier. Salvat simply stated that he was a "CIA Official" whom he had met. Morley broke the story of "Howard" back in 2001. In order to believe that Blakey asked Joannides about "Howard," one would have to believe that Blakey somehow became aware of this information back in the day, but said nothing about it for years and years to Morley or anyone else. In all of his numerous public statements about the Joannides matter prior to 2017, Blakey inexplicably never thought to say anything about his discussion with Joannides regarding "Howard."

Equally amazing is the citation that Blakey provides to prove his claim. It is the March 22, 1978 request for records that Reynolds and I have previously discussed in detail. At the time of this request, Joannides was not yet employed by the CIA as HSCA liaison. And the request says nothing about Joannides or "Howard." Nor does it even ask for information on the unknown 1963 case officer. It asks for information on Bringuier, Crozier, Lanusa, Salvat and the DRE in general.

It is clear that Blakey's statements on Joannides and the DRE have evolved greatly over many years. Blakey at first angrily accused Joannides of obstructing Congress. By 2006, he was saying Joannides lied directly to him. By 2017, Blakey was claiming that he asked Joannides about "Howard."

Conclusion

I believe Reynolds and I have made a strong case for the following:

• Morley is wrong when he says Hardway made a "direct request" to Joannides for the name of the DRE case officer.
• Despite learning in 1998 that Joannides was the 1963 DRE case officer, Blakey never stated that Joannides lied directly to anyone until 2006. Even then, he was merely reporting the undocumented assertions of Fonzi.
• Bitter disagreements between the CIA and the HSCA resulted in Blakey and Hardway being non-objective witnesses.
• There is no known documentary evidence of a specific written or oral request from anyone at the HSCA to Joannides for the identity of the 1963 DRE case officer.
• The May 23rd records request is not relevant to most of Blakey's claims about the DRE.
• The July 11th request cited by Blakey almost certainly never existed.
• The identity of the 1963 DRE case officer was not a major focus of the HSCA investigation as their report on the DRE shows. They instead focused on the dubious allegations of Clare Boothe Luce.
• The CIA did not admit that Joannides' service as liaison to the HSCA was a covert action. Rather, the agency drew a clear distinction between Joannides' tenure in the JMWAVE period and his HSCA assignment.
• It would make absolutely no sense for the CIA to tell Blakey they had no connection to the DRE or that their was no case officer assigned to the group in 1963 since these claims are easily refuted.
• Blakey's claim that he gave Joannides information about "Howard" which he obtained from the DRE is not worthy of belief.

I would again like to thank Robert Reynolds for his fine work on this article. I certainly could not have done it without him. I hope more researchers will take a look at his work. I would also like to thank Paul Hoch who provided several helpful suggestions.