Appendix A: The CIA and the Media 1960-1975

But by the end of 1974, David Phillips had become increasingly troubled. What he referred to as a “storm which changed my life” came just before Christmas in the form of a New York Times article by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh. His piece reported that “The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration against the anti-war movement and other dissident groups in the United States according to well-placed Government sources.”1 The sources Hersh referred to were undoubtedly familiar with a cache of nearly 700 pages of alleged agency transgressions that would later be popularly known as the “family jewels.”2 The “jewels” were commissioned in 1973 by then DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) James Schlesinger in the wake of the Watergate break-in, which included the participation of CIA veterans E. Howard Hunt and James McCord. The documents consisted of responses from agency employees to Schlesinger’s directive asking for any activities that might be a violation of the agency’s 1947 charter.3

The CIA-Media Relationship Before Watergate

The father of the CIA was unquestionably William “Wild Bill” Donavan, a World War One veteran who ran the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor of the agency, during the second world war. Donovan conceptualized several important facets of the CIA including the bureaucratic proximity to the President, the coordination of all intelligence agencies and the need for a peacetime intelligence capability. President Harry S. Truman created the CIA when he signed the National Security Act on July 26, 1947.4

The Hersh article that so troubled Phillips and other CIA insiders was the climax of a war between the CIA and the media that had roots in the fifties.5 During that decade, DCI Allen Dulles successfully used a network of journalists to promote himself, and the agency by association, as an benign intellectual patriarch who was contemplative rather than action oriented. The CIA’s uneasy trek toward the loss of media domination began in 1956 with the institution of the U-2 spy plane program. President Dwight Eisenhower had become enamored with the high-altitude craft after being shown surveillance photos of himself golfing at the famed Augusta National club in Georgia. Eisenhower was able to see details such as his ball resting on the green even though the U-2 was at an altitude of 55,000 feet when the pictures were taken. Although the risks were considerable due to the possibility that the plane could malfunction or be shot down, the U-2 successfully provided valuable Soviet intelligence for four years.

Then on May 1st, 1960, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was indeed blown out of the sky by the Soviets and captured. Sticking to a predetermined cover story, the White House and the State Department both issued press releases stating that NASA had lost a test plane engaged in meteorological research. The CIA assured Eisenhower that it was unlikely that either the pilot, the plane, or the surveillance footage could have survived the crash. As a final failsafe, the U-2 pilots carried suicide pills in the event of capture and were expected to use them. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev remained silent for several days while the US authorities promoted their false narrative. Then on May 7th, Khrushchev revealed to the world that he possessed not only the wreckage of the plane and rolls of surveillance footage, but the pilot himself who was alive and well. Eisenhower had been caught in a massive lie.

The U-2 debacle could not have come at a worse time for the United States. The four nation Paris peace summit scheduled for the middle of May was ultimately abandoned after Eisenhower refused to apologize to Khrushchev for the U-2 incident. The CIA would also be chastened by their role in the incident. House Appropriations Chair Clarence Cannon rose during an open session to reveal to the American public that the U-2 had been under the direction and control of the agency. The CIA’s role in the spy program was detailed in exposés by journalists Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson. There was no doubt that the CIA of the sixties was fully in the public spotlight and the tranquil era of fifties journalistic indifference was over.

As embarrassing as the U-2 incident was for the CIA, an even greater calamity was soon to follow. In April of 1961, an operation began at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba involving around 1400 CIA trained and equipped Cuban exiles. The plan called for the exiles to establish a beachhead and incite a spontaneous uprising against Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The mission failed miserably due to a lack of air support and over 100 exiles were killed while the rest were captured. The bungled mission was a public humiliation for the new President John F. Kennedy who had inherited a version of the plan from the Eisenhower administration. Although JFK publicly accepted responsibility for the incident, his administration leaked information to the media that pointed the finger of blame squarely at the CIA. White House aides Theodore Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger would later write books that also sought to shift responsibility away from JFK and to the agency.

The CIA’s critics blamed the agency on several fronts. First, they faulted the CIA planners for not calling off the mission when they learned that operational security had been compromised. This lack of security had manifested itself in the form of newspaper reports going back as far as January of 1961. Alarmingly, by April, several news organizations including the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal had reported on the anticipated invasion. Secondly, Richard Bissell, the CIA Deputy Director of Plans who oversaw the project, was blasted for not keeping JFK fully informed. For example, only days before the ill-fated mission two key planners had predicted the mission would fail because the landing area was too secluded and unpopulated to support any spontaneous uprising by the locals. Finally, the critics said that the agency, fueled by several triumphs in the fifties, had become arrogant and overestimated the odds of victory in Cuba as a result. Rather than the benign force portrayed by Dulles and his media acolytes in the fifties, the CIA was now increasingly depicted in the press as an arm of United States neo-imperialism.

In the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle, scholarly criticism of the CIA began to emerge. The first such tome was Andrew Tully’s bestseller CIA: The Inside Story published in 1962. Tully’s work, which drew heavily on Moscow-sponsored propaganda pieces published in the Third World, received critical praise in the mainstream press. Two years later, a new book would establish a blueprint for CIA criticism that endures to the present day. The Invisible Government, by veteran reporters David Wise and Thomas Ross, posited that the CIA had become so large and influential that it threatened democracy rather than defended it. The authors also maintained that the agency was a rogue elephant that was immune to control by either the White House or Congress. In addition to the U-2 and Bay of Pigs episodes, Wise and Ross provided details on CIA misdeeds in southeast Asia to support their thesis.

The CIA was able to obtain galley proofs of the book and was shocked by what they read. The agency identified eight employees named in the book who were serving in sensitive clandestine posts abroad. They were also concerned that the book would provide the Soviets with valuable information that they could use to denigrate US foreign policy and undermine the agency around the globe. DCI John McCone and his deputy Marshall Carter both phoned the book’s publisher Random House to secure revisions. After being rejected, the agency threatened to buy the entire first print run of 20,000 copies. When that plan proved impractical, the CIA settled for a handful of unfavorable reviews from trusted sources such as William F. Buckley who wrote that the authors had “done a disservice to their country” and their work “verged close to unpatriotic.”

In 1964, Joachim Joesten’s book Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy flat-out accused the CIA of complicity in the JFK assassination. However, it was later revealed that Joesten was a paid Soviet disinformation agent and his publisher was a KGB front. Although Joesten’s book could be dismissed as Soviet propaganda, other journalistic efforts could not be as easily rebuffed. In April 1966, Ramparts magazine, the most ubiquitous left-wing publication of the era, issued an article maintaining that the CIA had infiltrated the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group. The purpose of the group, working independent of most US government entities, was to advise and train agencies of the Diem government in public and police administration and economics.6 Ramparts’ assertion of CIA infiltration of the group became a cause célèbre for the early anti-war movement.

Ramparts scored another anti-agency coup in February of the following year when they reported that the CIA had subsidized the National Student Association. The agency had allegedly paid the group $20,000 annually to influence decision making at international conferences through promotion of the western viewpoint. In response, the New York Times lamented the agency’s “corruption of youthful idealism.” Following the lead of Ramparts, other news organizations revealed agency links to think tanks, universities, labor unions and other groups. CBS news correspondent Mike Wallace hosted a 60 Minutes special that revealed that even liberals such as Gloria Steinem had knowingly made use of CIA subsidies. Due in no small part to the efforts of Ramparts, the agency was the recipient of harsh media criticism throughout the remainder of the sixties.

In May of 1973 came the revelation that some of the “plumbers” who had engineered the Watergate break-in had CIA ties. E. Howard Hunt, the former high-ranking agency officer who had been the mastermind of the incident, received more than his share of attention from the anti-CIA media. Seymour Hersh cemented his reputation in that regard with his September 1974 reporting of agency efforts in Chile that led to the overthrow of the Salvador Allende regime the previous year. But purveyors of news and opinion journalism were not the only problem for the agency. Film makers had also jumped on the bandwagon with agency-panning epics such as Scorpio, Marathon Man, The Spook Who Sat by the Door and Three Days of the Condor. These films reinforced the notion of the CIA as a Machiavellian force populated by impassive assassins.7 If all of this was not bad enough, a new threat had emerged from within the agency itself.

Victor Marchetti

Prior to the decade of the seventies, books published by CIA officers largely sought to defend the agency in the wake of indignities such as the Bay of Pigs.8 Two factors were responsible for the lack of any critical agency analysis by CIA men turned scribes. First was a secrecy agreement that agency employees were required to sign which compelled them to keep the secrets of the CIA in perpetuity. The second was an unwritten code that held as much sway as the legally binding secrecy agreement: never celebrate successes and never explain failures. The CIA was not merely a job, it was a belief system that the employee voluntarily acknowledged. And the main threat to the cold warriors of the CIA was undeniably communism.

Victor Marchetti was one of two key whistleblowers to emerge in the seventies. Marchetti, who was a graduate of Penn State University, was recruited by the CIA in 1955. Marchetti’s dissatisfaction with the agency was directly equivalent to his rise in prominence within the organization. Eventually, he was one of few individuals who had morning coffee with DCI Richard Helms, and it was during such private connections that Marchetti was able to discern what he referred to as “the big picture.” In Marchetti’s eyes, the CIA upper echelon were, “super-patriots, believers in the America Imperium, America as the new England that should spread its philosophies around the world” he told Mort Kondracke in 1972.9

Marchetti provided differing versions of his motive for finally leaving the CIA. In one account, the Vietnam conflict was the primary motivator for his eventual turn against the agency and he characterized the war as “the biggest damn blunder we’d ever made.” He was extremely unsettled by the fact that while some agency analysts were reporting that Vietnam was a “lost cause,” the CIA nevertheless continued working with the controversial Phoenix Program whose goal was the destruction of the Viet Cong’s political infrastructure and leadership. But, Marchetti told another interviewer that he was repelled by the “amorality” of the CIA and quit at the urging of his wife. Additionally, Marchetti was angered by what he perceived as an ethnic bias in the agency against Italian-Americans. According to Marchetti, CIA agents tended to be, “WASPS from the Ivy League.”10

Marchetti resigned from the agency in 1969 and by 1971 had published a novel called The Rope Dancer. The book had been vetted by agency officers who posed no objection strictly from a security standpoint. However, behind the scenes many in the CIA were alarmed. Although the book had been marketed as pure fiction, the plot was clearly based on Marchetti’s own agency experience. The book’s protagonists were uncomplimentary versions of Helms and counterintelligence chief James Angleton. And in a scenario that mirrored the situation in Chile, the book had agents plotting the overthrow of an imaginary South American nation.

The book’s hero Paul Franklin, who was modeled on Marchetti himself, sells secrets to the Soviets before defecting to the red empire. For this reason, Marchetti was placed under surveillance by the CIA in March of 1972 for a period of about one month. The agency found no evidence that Marchetti was planning to sell secrets or defect to the Soviet Union, but they eventually did learn that he was shopping another book to various publishing houses. The agency was able to obtain a copy of the book proposal through an industry contact. Marchetti’s prospective tome would not be a mere spy novel, but rather a tell-all that threatened to expose secrets such as Operation CHAOS, a domestic agency spy program.

Helms went directly to President Nixon to make the case for legal intervention by the US government and found a sympathetic ear. Nixon despised leakers and had long admired the British Official Secrets Act which allowed the government to prosecute individuals who revealed classified information. With approval from Nixon secured, the CIA requested a court order requiring Marchetti to surrender his writings to the agency for review prior to publication. In April of 1972, Judge Albert Bryan Jr of the Federal District Court of Virginia ruled in favor of the CIA by issuing a temporary injunction. The decision was roundly criticized by the more liberal members of the press. Just one month later, Bryan’s temporary ruling became permanent. When Marchetti appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court, they upheld Bryan’s decision with the stipulation that any censorship would be limited to classified material. The US Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

Undaunted, Marchetti teamed with former State Department employee John Marks to pen a 400-page tome titled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence which earned a $45,000 advance from publisher Alfred K. Knopf. Adhering to the court order, Marchetti submitted the book to the CIA for review. After a month-long evaluation, the agency ordered the authors to remove approximately one quarter of the book. The authors filed suit to dispute the deletions and the case returned to the courtroom of Judge Bryan. In March of 1974 the CIA, under increasing media scrutiny, agreed to reduce the number of deletions from the original 339 to 168. However, Judge Bryan effectively sided with Marchetti and Marks and ordered that only 27 items be censored from the book. The CIA filed an appeal, and to avoid further delay of the book’s publication, Knopf released a version with 168 blank spaces while the reinstated 141 passages were bolded. To some reviewers, the deletions reinforced the book’s contention that the CIA was hiding illicit secrets.

Marchetti’s thesis was that, “[CIA agents] went to work for the agency during the Cold War because they wanted to do something for their country, which they thought was the Good, and to stop the spread of communism, which is the Bad.”11 According to the book, The United States, rather than a force for good, was a bully that used the CIA to violate the sovereignty of other nations in a single-minded desire to acquire foreign markets. The CIA’s mission had morphed from that of intelligence gathering to an obsession with covert action and the authors suggested that the agency was merely an arm of “corporate America.”

Politically, Marchetti was no flaming liberal and had been published in the ultra-conservative Liberty Lobby’s tabloid Spotlight. He once commented that the CIA’s men were not “right-wing extremists” and did not “come across at all like John-Birchers,” but rather like “Eastern Liberals who are interested in advancing America overseas.” Moreover, Marchetti had no problem accusing these anonymous CIA men of crimes including assassination. “It’s interesting how CIA liberals justify murder,” he opined. “They pretend they aren’t responsible for it. They hire the guy who hires the guy who actually commits the act, but they pretend they had no part in it.”12

Although Marchetti’s story made great copy for the liberal press, not every outlet was convinced. An Op-Ed in the Detroit News said that “it is logical for any government to ensure that their intelligence officers abide by their pledged word never-not even after quitting the job-to reveal information acquired while on the job.” The piece concluded that “A never-never land of unrealism opens up when anyone signing a work contract reserves to himself the right later to break it. In this instance, Marchetti used his $25,000-a-year access to secrets to make money later by his spy novels. If Intelligence Officers are allowed to get away with that malarkey, the CIA will become, not the guardian, but the sieve of the nation’s top secrets.”13 In 1985, Marchetti’s reputation took a hit when he was forced to admit that key parts of his 1978 article linking E. Howard Hunt to a JFK assassination conspiracy were based on rumors that he had allegedly heard from Penthouse columnist Bill Corson. However, in a sworn deposition, Corson denied even talking about the rumors with Marchetti.14

Phillip Agee

Another CIA whistleblower emerged in the seventies who proved even more troublesome to the agency than Marchetti.15 Phillip Agee served as a CIA officer from 1957 to 1968 and unlike Marchetti who was tied to a desk, Agee had eight years of covert experience in various posts in Latin America. Why did Agee resign from an excellent government job after only eleven years? In his version of the story, Agee’s Roman Catholic upbringing compelled him to resign for ethical reasons. Like Marchetti, Agee believed that the CIA had become “the secret policeman of capitalism” and was used by US Presidents primarily to further corporate interests. According to Agee, unimaginable horrors were occurring throughout South America perpetrated by military dictatorships at the behest of the CIA and the US government. Regarding his relationship with the CIA, Agee claimed there was no bad blood at all and his employer was “startled” to learn that he was resigning. The truth is quite different.

CIA evaluations of Agee’s performance were unflattering to say the least. One report said that Agee, “showed himself to be an egotistical, superficially intelligent, but essentially shallow young man.” A second report said that his “financial accountings were constantly in a poor state,” and that he was “always borrowing money.” Additionally, Agee had a drinking and womanizing problem and had been accused of propositioning the wives of US embassy staff in a vulgar manner. This litany of offenses was more than enough reason to dismiss Agee since an intelligence officer needs to be free from the threat of blackmail. But there was more. Agee finally sealed his fate when he separated from his wife after committing multiple extramarital infidelities. In defiance of a court order, Agee relocated his children to Mexico where he cohabitated with a mistress who was an American “deeply involved in leftist activity.” Agee’s ex-wife threatened to reveal the nature of Agee’s CIA work unless the children were returned to the US. With this, the CIA asked Agee to resign and he complied.

Agee stayed in Mexico after his resignation and studied at the National Autonomous University of Mexico which was known for its leftist leanings. Agee planned to make money through associations with wealthy Mexicans he had met during his CIA days. But according to CIA records his, “grandiose schemes for making money in Mexico did not bear fruit.” It was then that Agee apparently decided to make use of the information he had gleaned during his CIA career. In 1973, Agee appeared at the KGB station in Mexico City and offered the Soviets substantial information on CIA operations around the world. However, the KGB suspected that Agee was a plant and summarily dismissed him. Undaunted, Agee took his offer to the Cuban Dirección General De Inteligencia (DGI), who quickly accepted.

Agee repeatedly denied that he was either a Cuban or Soviet agent. However, there is ample evidence to the contrary. One report from a highly placed Cuban defector had Agee receiving upwards of one million dollars from the DGI. In 1999, Vasili Mitrokhin, a Soviet defector who escaped with a large file archive, stated that Agee was a communist agent with the codename PONT. Finally, in an interview with Christopher Moran, Cameron LaClair, a twenty-one-year veteran of the CIA, said the agency had collected “overwhelming” evidence that Agee had been “in the hands of the Cuban intelligence service.”

In 1971, Agee authored an article critical of the CIA and stated that he was writing a book. With that information in hand, the agency sent an operative named Salvatore Ferrera to Paris where Agee was then located. Ferrera was to befriend the turncoat and gain his trust using the cover of an “underground” journalist who had ties to the Paris anti-war movement. Ferrera knew that Agee had a weakness for women and introduced him to Leslie Donegan, an attractive blonde who was ostensibly a Geneva University graduate student. Donegan was really an undercover agent named Janet Strickland whose job was to acquire a copy of Agee’s manuscript. Under the guise of being a patron of the arts, Strickland offered to fund Agee’s writing and gave him a typewriter and the use of her apartment. In return, Agee provided Strickland with 250 pages of draft material.

Unfortunately for the agency, Agee found that the typewriter was packed with listening devices and batteries to power them. Ironically, the money that Strickland gave Agee effectively funded the book since he had been destitute before the agent’s arrival. Agee relocated to London and worked on the book, likely with Soviet and Cuban help, until its completion in 1974. Agee eventually used a photograph of the bugged typewriter on the cover of the tome which was titled Inside the Company: CIA Diary. The book was published in 1975 by London’s Penguin publishing house in order to avoid the editing that Marchetti had been subject to.

Like Marchetti’s work, the thesis of Agee’s tell-all was that the United States was sponsoring dictators in Latin America for the furtherance of American corporations and their stockholders. Agee’s criticism of the agency knew no bounds. He accused them of bugging, blackmail and burglary as well as hiring individuals to plant bombs and buying and selling politicians, union officials and journalists. But this condemnation was not the most provocative aspect of Agee’s work. He identified approximately 250 individuals working overseas including foreign agents, front companies and other agency collaborators. Notable individuals who worked with the agency that were identified by Agee included President Luis Echeverría Álvarez of Mexico, President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of Columbia and Jose Figueres Ferrer of Costa Rica.

By revealing names, Agee had gone from a whistleblower ostensibly interested in exposing potential illegalities to something akin to a dangerous traitor, at least in the mind of CIA supporters. The agency’s in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, wrote that, “A considerable number of CIA personnel must be diverted from their normal duties to undertake the meticulous and time-consuming task of repairing the damage done to its Latin American program, and to see what can be done to help those injured by the author’s revelations.” In an unpublished article, David Phillips predicted that Agee’s book would result in the “unnecessary death of an American intelligence officer abroad,” and accused Agee of being, “responsible for untold worry and anxiety on the part of CIA families.”

The Death of Richard Welch

In May of 1975, David Phillips made his decision to retire from the CIA and become a public advocate for the agency (see Chapter 5). Meanwhile, Phillips’ adversaries were pursuing the agency with a vengeance. Phillip Agee saw his book, Inside the Company, as merely the first volley in a veritable war with the CIA. To this end, he became closely affiliated with the Fifth Estate, an ostensible watchdog organization founded by Norman Mailer. The group got off to a rough start when Mailer hosted a gala event at the Four Seasons off New York’s Park Avenue. Instead of a promised “announcement of national importance,” Mailer delivered a drunken soliloquy that was panned by the media. However, considering the emerging Watergate revelations, Mailer’s claims of conspiracies amid a secret government seemed plausible. Agee found a valuable ally in Mailer and worked on the Fifth Estate’s magazine Counterspy which was produced by a group of disillusioned former intelligence officers.16

One stated goal of Counterspy was to reveal the names of CIA officials in order to force the agency to bring the “techno-fascists” home. To this end, the magazine published a piece call “How to Spot a Spook” that explained how to use government publications to identify undercover agency operatives. But Counterspy’s most lurid revelation came in 1975 when it published the names of 225 CIA employees around the world. One of those whose name was made public was Richard Welch, the Athens Station Chief and a close friend of David Phillips. On the night of December 23, 1975, Welch was ambushed near his suburban home by three masked men and killed.17

The CIA quickly blamed The Fifth Estate and Agee for the disaster. An agency press release stated, “We’ve had an American gunned down by other Americans fingering him-rightly or wrongly-as a CIA agent.” Counterspy quickly sought to deflect such criticism by pointing out that Welch had been previously outed by an East German publication. “The blood of Mr. Welch is on the hands of the CIA,” Counterspy insisted, arguing that the agency had allowed Welch to live in a house known to be the usual residence of the Station Chief. But such pronouncements by Agee and Counterspy met with little sympathy. The Washington Post wrote that Welch’s death was, “The entirely predictable result of the disclosure tactics chosen by certain American critics of the agency.” The Post added that Counterspy’s disclosure of Welch’s name was “tantamount to an open invitation to kill him.”18

David Phillips’ prediction made six months earlier of the death of an Intelligence Officer due to the revelations of Counterspy, had come to pass as far as he and like-mined individuals were concerned. Phillips told the Orlando Sentinel’s Harry Wessel that American Intelligence Officers around the world were in increasing danger. “The present tarnished image of the CIA in this country,” Phillips maintained, “has led foreigners to believe the agency is weaker than they thought.” Phillips admitted that disclosures of potential “illegal CIA activity” were necessary but characterized the overall media coverage as excessive “largely because of Watergate.” Phillips reserved most of his anger over Welch’s death for Agee who he called “the first American defector” from the CIA. Phillips alleged that Agee had gleaned information for his book during five trips to Cuba and that the data came straight from the island nation’s “documentation centers.”19

Phillips’ war with those who he saw as enemies of the CIA and America by association would continue for over a decade. But unbeknownst to him, the anti-agency climate was generating a new group of antagonists. Those opponents would prove to be the among the toughest yet for Phillips from a personal standpoint and he would fight them for the rest of his life.

The Bishop Hoax: Table of Contents


1. Seymour Hersh, “Huge CIA Operation Reported in US Against Anti-War Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” The New York Times, December 22, 1974, 1.
2. Moran, Company Confessions, 107.
3. Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, “CIA to Air Decades of its Dirty Laundry,” The Washington Post, June 22, 2007.
4. Ranelagh, The Agency, 37, 110.
5. The analysis of the CIA’s loss of credibility with the American public during the period from 1960 to 1974 is based on the excellent summary by Christopher Moran in his book Company Confessions pages 88-107 unless otherwise indicated.
6. Scigliano and Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam, 2.
7. Moran, “The Last Assignment,” 344.
8. The section on Marks and Marchetti is based on Christopher Moran’s Company Confessions pages 109-122 unless otherwise indicated.
9. Kondracke, “The Selling of the CIA.”
10. Kondracke, “The Selling of the CIA.”
11. Kondracke, “The Selling of the CIA.”
12. Kondracke, “The Selling of the CIA.”
13. Op-Ed, “Marchetti’s Cloud-Nine Logic,” The Detroit News, July 24, 1972.
14. Stephen K. Doig, “Ex-CIA Agent Admits He Used ‘Rumors’,” The Miami Herald, February 2, 1985, 2B.
15. The section on Agee is based on Christopher Moran’s Company Confessions pages 122-141 unless otherwise indicated.
16. Moran, Company Confessions, 130-131.
17. Moran, Company Confessions, 131-133.
18. Moran, Company Confessions, 133-134.
19. Harry Wessel, “Ex-CIA Agent Warned of Killings,” The Orlando Sentinel, January 18, 1976, 12.


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