Did the CIA "Lie" to the ARRB About Joannides?

Introduction

Jefferson Morley has implied or flatly stated that the CIA lied to the ARRB in response to the concerns he raised regarding George Joannides and the DRE. A few examples follow.

In Morley's "Revelation 19.63" article published in the Miami New Times, he made several allegations:

In December 1997 I suggested that the board ask the CIA to review its files on the Revolutionary Student Directorate. An official in the CIA's Office of Historic Review, J. Barry Harrelson, responded with a memo stating that no agency employee had been in contact with the DRE in 1963.

When I asked the CIA in 1999 to explain why J. Barry Harrelson of the agency's Office of Historic Review had, a year earlier, denied that the CIA had had any contact with the Directorate in 1963, as well as any knowledge of Joannides's activities that year, a spokesman said the agency could not help me. "We think the records speak for themselves," he replied.

In his 2008 book Our Man in Mexico, Morley wrote:

When the JFK Records Review Board asked the CIA to account for the missing monthly [DRE] progress reports in January 1998, CIA official Barry Harrelson replied that the agency did not really have a relationship with the DRE in 1963 (Our Man in Mexico, 324).

A more recent example may be found in Morley's response to Robert Reynolds' Washington Decoded article. Morley wrote:

In 1998, Barry Harrelson of the CIA told the ARRB in a memo that the Agency didn’t know who handled the DRE in 1963; that the agency ended its relationship with the group in 1963; and that’s why there’s no report for November 1963.

But Morley's assertions are false or misleading at best. A chronological study of the CIA records pertaining to the issue obtained by the ARRB show what the CIA really told Morley and the ARRB. The records also show that Morley's arrogant and confrontational attitude toward the agency did little to help his cause.

Morley Contacts the CIA

Morley's communication with the CIA about the Joannides-DRE matter began in November of 1997 when he presumptuously wrote to CIA Director George Tenet asking for a "briefing" in his capacity as a Washington Post reporter. Morley told Tenet that he planned to ask several questions about "Howard" the DRE contact he would eventually decide was Joannides. The CIA denied Morley's request because the CIA's ARRB document review was in progress at the time. Privately, a CIA memo noted that the CIA-AARB relationship could be "jeopardized or damaged" if Morley were to receive a briefing on matters that the ARRB had instructed the agency to investigate.

In January of 1998 Morley again pursued the issue. Audaciously, he faxed Director Tenet asking for an "unclassified briefing" on the "activities and professional performance" of the CIA officer whose "agents in a Miami-based anti-Castro organization" had been in contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. Unsurprisingly, Tenet apparently ignored Morley's request. Undaunted, Morley followed up with a letter to Tom Crispel of the agency's Public Affairs Office stating that in lieu of his "unclassified briefing," he wanted an "explanation" and wanted it "in writing." CIA officials familiar with the records probably spotted Morley's incorrect statement about "Miami-based agents" contacting Oswald and that likely didn't help his cause. Actually, it was the New Orleans DRE delegation who had the contact with Oswald—not the agency-funded Miami DRE members.

The January 20, 1998 Harrelson Memo

One of the most important CIA-ARRB communications and one that Morley has repeatedly mischaracterized is a memo from CIA JFK Project Senior Reviewer Barry Harrelson to ARRB Executive Director Jeremy Gunn. Harrelson was responding to Gunn's December 18, 1997 letter to James Oliver, the Chief of the CIA's Historical Review Program (HRP).

Harrelson noted that Gunn "specifically" asked about two things—the identity of "Howard" and "missing DRE monthly operational reports." Harrelson stated that his responses to Gunn were based on "extensive" research by the "responsible offices."

Harrelson first addressed the DRE reports. He told Gunn that the CIA's search of databases had failed to turn up reports for the period December 1962 through April 1964 "in general" and August and November of 1963 "in particular." Harrelson then offered what was obviously a speculative explanation for the lack of reports during the period in question.

Harrelson noted that "major policy differences" had developed between the CIA and the DRE during the December 1962 to April 1964 period. These differences may have caused the agency to reduce the level of funding for the DRE according to Harrelson's theory. The DRE was also assigned a new case officer in late 1962. At about the same time, the operational reports stopped. "It seems probable" Harrelson wrote, "these events are linked and that reporting in the form of such monthly reports simply stopped."

Harrelson moved on to Gunn's second concern, the identity of "Howard." "We, like you, have no clear understanding about the use of this particular name on DRE messages," Harrelson noted. "We first attempted to identify if, in fact, 'Howard' was an actual person. The name was not found to be a pseudonym. It also was not found to be a registered alias. It also is not the true name of any case officer associated with the DRE operation at the time the DRE documents were written" Harrelson said.

Finally, Harrelson reported that "knowledgeable case officers" had been consulted and had theorized that the use of "To Howard" in some DRE memoranda might have been a "routing indicator" to make sure the documents went to the right CIA officer. Note that despite Morley's claims, Harrelson never said that "Howard" was not a real person, only that the agency had no record of such an individual.

The March 3, 1998 Combs Memo

Less than two months after the Harrelson to Gunn memo, the CIA provided more information about the DRE. ARRB researcher Michelle Combs was given access to the file of CIA officer George Joannides who used the registered CIA pseudonym of Walter Newby. Combs reported in a memo to Gunn that Joannides was the DRE case officer for the period December 1962 to April 1964. Combs also noted:

CIA provided access to the Office of Personnel file for Mr. George E. Joannides. I have examined the personnel file for Mr. Joannides for the period 1961-64 and 1978-79 ... The descriptions of his duties and accomplishments in the personnel file are very general and contain no specific reference to his relationship with the DRE. There is no mention of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in the file and no information relevant to the assassination in the file.

Despite the mundane nature of the file and the lack of relevance to the JFK case, the ARRB designated several performance reviews and a memo as assassination records and ordered their release.

The December 3, 1998 Morley Letter to the CIA

By December, Morley had learned of the information in the Harrelson and Combs memos. Suffice it to say he was not impressed and dashed off another letter to the agency. Morley hoped to change his luck by contacting General Counsel Britt Snider at the suggestion of "mutual friend" Washington Post journalist Scott Armstrong. Morley's letter represents the first known public expression of his inaccurate assertions regarding the CIA's response to ARRB requests.

Morley contended that the CIA HRP provided "inaccurate information" namely that "no 'actual person' was handling contacts with the DRE in 1963." Morley also claimed that he was told by Tom Crispell that the CIA "had no records as to the identity of the DRE's case officer." Morley went on to say that the Combs memo proved the DRE had a case officer who was known to be Joannides.

Morley argued that the the CIA's "inaccurate statement about Mr. Joannides logically raises questions about the agency's statement that it cannot locate any written reports generated by him." Morley went on to cite his interviews with CIA officers as proof that Joannides would have filed DRE progress reports. Morley also claimed there was "abundant evidence" in CIA and DRE records that Joannides used the alias "Howard."

Morley finished his diatribe with three points paraphrased as follows:

1. Why did the CIA make inaccurate statements about the DRE case officer? What were the names of the "knowledgeable officers" who informed Harrelson that "Howard" was a "routing indicator?"
2. What is the CIA's explanation for the lack of DRE progress reports? What were Joannides' reporting obligations and did he fulfill them?
3. Will the CIA provide a background briefing to clarify these and other questions?

Oliver's Devastating Reply to Morley

On February 18, 1999, James Oliver responded to Morley taking apart his assertions one at a time. His letter is reproduced here in full:

This responds to your letter of 3 December 1998 to Mr. Britt Snider concerning certain records released under the JFK Assassinations Records Act and our representation to the JFK Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). I believe that a careful review of the actual documents you cite (i.e. our 20 January 1998 letter to the ARRB and the 3 March 1998 internal ARRB memorandum) will answer your concerns. Accordingly, we have addressed your three principal questions below in this context.

First, you assert that in an exchange with the ARRB (presumably the 20 January 1998 letter), "the Historical Review Office responded with inaccurate information: to wit, that no 'actual person' was handling contacts with the DRE in 1963 ..." I believe it is abundantly clear that the 20 January 1998 letter says just the opposite. For example, paragraph three states that "... [the agency] ... replaced the officer designated to deal with the DRE. Then about the same time, the monthly operational reports trailed off ..." Moreover, and far from contradicting our 20 January 1998 letter, the 3 March 1998 ARRB memorandum actually confirms the veracity of the eariler Agency statement.

Second, you assert that "The Agency's inaccurate statement about Mr. Joannides logically raises questions about the agency's statement that it cannot locate any written reports generated by him." Here, neither the precondition for the statement, nor the statement itself, is accurate. Again, our 20 January letter provides the most logical explanation for the absence of any written reports on Mr. Joannides (i.e. AM/SPELL) and that is (a) the Agency reduced funding for the DRE during this period and (b) monthly reporting on this project "simply stopped" because of this reduced involvement.

And third, you raise the issue of the identity or existence of "Howard." As you note, "To Howard," was used as an addressee on certain correspondence. However, as specifically addressed in the 20 January 1998 memorandum, the name "Howard" could not be found in our listings of registered pseudonyms or aliases and there is no other evidence to suggest that "Howard" was an identity for Joannides. Moreover, as far as we can determine, "Howard" is not the true name of any officer associated with the DRE at the time the DRE documents were written. In no way did the 20 January say categorically, as you suggest in your letter, that "... 'knowledgeable case officers' ... informed J. Barry Harrelson that the man known to DRE as "Howard" (i.e. George Joannides) was not an 'actual person' but merely a 'routing indicator.'" In sum, the one fact that remains today is that we have insufficient evidence as to who or what the word "Howard" represented and that is exactly what the 20 January letter says.

In sum, a careful review of the correspondence cited in your letter does not support an allegation that the Agency has made "false or misleading statements to the ARRB about these matters." In fact, the records on these issues establish quite clearly that the Agency was candid and truthful, that the ARRB staff members had access to and thoroughly reviewed all relevant information on the issues you raised, and that the ARRB was satisfied with their detailed review.

I trust that this information satisfies your concerns.

So, it is clear that by early 1999 Morley's assertions had been debunked by the agency. Nevertheless, he continues to repeat these same discredited allegations more than twenty years later.

It should be mentioned that Morley's minor claim that Tom Crispell of the Public Affairs Office told him (presumably orally) that the CIA "had no records as to the identity of the DRE's case officer" was addressed by Harrelson in a memorandum for the record. Harrelson wrote that the HRP record of the proposed conversation did not support Morley's allegation. Crispell was to simply tell Morley that he would not be receiving a briefing and additional information on the matter would be made public through the ARRB. If, and this is a big if given Morley's record of inaccuracy, Crispell said anything to Morley about the lack of DRE records identifying their case officer, it was obviously just uninformed speculation on his part since Combs identified the case officer as Joannides.

Why are the DRE Progress Reports Missing?

We have seen that Morley's assertions about the CIA are baseless. Still, that leaves some questions. What about the DRE progress reports? And who was "Howard?"

Morley says that the reporting process was as follows. The case officer filed reports with their "reporting officers." These individuals them summarized the information for Miami station chief Ted Shackley who then edited the report before sending it to CIA headquarters.

Morley has attached significance to the fact that there are no DRE progress reports for roughly the same period that Joannides was the group's case officer. As Vincent Bugliosi put it in the endnotes (p. 678) of his Reclaiming History, "Morley believes [the reports] do exist and the CIA is stonewalling for some reason that’s not good."

But the reports do not exist or at least cannot be located. And the courts determined that the CIA "has conducted adequate [document] searches and justified any withholdings under applicable FOIA exemptions." That leaves the following possibilities.

• The reports never existed in the first place. Under this scenario Joannides and/or his superior Ted Shackley decided to not file reports either because the DRE's significance had diminished in the eyes of the agency (due to "major policy differences" as Harrelson suggested in 1998) or for another reason. Morley claims that Shackley told him the reports existed but later canceled a scheduled interview. Perhaps Shackley, like Carlos Bringuier, checked out Morley and didn't like what he saw.
• The reports existed but are missing for a non-nefarious reason.

Morley's characterization of the reason for the "missing" reports varies depending on what forum he is using. For example, in his "Revelation 19.63" article, Morley wrote that if the reports existed they were either "destroyed without authorization" or kept "secret," allowing for no other possibilities.

But in a 2009 deposition (made under penalty of perjury) for his case against the CIA, Morley conceded that the CIA's Harrelson was on "logically firmer ground" when he attributed the end of the DRE reportage to the "go/no go status" of the DRE since the exile group was "highly controversial" within CIA ranks. Morley went on to allow that Harrelson may have been correct when he said that the absence of monthly reports reflected a "decision to change the reporting procedure." Morley theorized that such a change involved Joannides reporting to the Military Operations Branch in Washington rather than to Shackley in Miami. Morley went on to maintain that searches should be undertaken at the Military Operations Branch for the "missing" reports. The point is, Morley is indeed aware that there are other explanations for the "missing" reports that do not involve their unauthorized destruction or the reports being suspiciously hidden away.

Who was "Howard?"

Morley says that "Howard" was a name used by Joannides in his contacts with the DRE. That is certainly possible and there is no doubt that the DRE knew their CIA contact as "Howard." But the identification of "Howard" as Joannides rests solely on the remembrances of DRE member Luis Fernandez Rocha, who was the only DRE man who actually met Joannides. According to Morley, Fernandez Rocha said that "Howard" spoke with a "New York accent, was a lawyer, and looked to be of Mediterranean extraction." But Morley interviewed Fernandez Rocha more than thirty years after his experiences with "Howard." So, his remembrances could be cloudy or influenced by leading questions by Morley. We don't know because Morley has never released his interview transcripts. The key point is that no documentary evidence exists to show "Howard" was Joannides. The documents Morley has produced only show that the DRE knew their CIA contact as "Howard."

"Howard" could just have easily been an individual that Joannides assigned to communicate with the DRE. Such a move by Joannides would hardly be surprising since it would be a way to keep a buffer between himself and the DRE. But if, in fact, "Howard" was Joannides, the CIA searches prove that his use of the moniker was "off the books."